Great depression history revisited

It is interesting to see that almost everyone (media and politicians) is saying that this is not going to be like the great depression when actually there is an amazing amount of simmilarity between the current situation and the 1930's. Like in that era, there was a big increase in household and business leverage and great confidence that crissis could be averted by policy measures.

I think there is a possibility that things may have changed in an irreversible way in the last year and that they maybe quite different in the next 15 years to what they were in the previous 15. We now have a worldwide economic downturn with likely recessions in 2009 for US, EURO, Japan, China, basically everywhere, except perhaps australia and one or 2 other countries

Zooming back in history (using wiki's description of the great depression) : what is missing except Smoot-Hawley, protectionism and war ? Maybe that is for later.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Depression

1. The Great Depression was a worldwide economic downturn
2. The Great Depression originated in the United States due to stock market revaluations from 1929
3. structural factors such as massive bank failures were significant
4. Massive increases in deficit spending, new banking regulation, and boosting farm prices did start turning the U.S. economy around, but it was a very slow and painful process. The U.S. had not returned to 1929's GNP for over a decade and still had an unemployment rate of about 15% in 1940 — down from 25% in 1933.
- Hoover launched a series of programs to increase farm prices, which failed, expanded federal spending in public works such as dams, and launched the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) which aided cities, banks and railroads, and continued as a major agency under the New Deal. To provide unemployment relief he set up the Emergency Relief Agency (ERA) that operated until 1935 as the Federal Emergency Relief Agency. Quarter by quarter the economy went downhill, as prices, profits and employment fell, leading to the political realignment in 1932 that brought to power the New Deal.
5. Australia's dependence on agricultural and industrial exports meant it was eventually one of the hardest-hit countries in the Western world. Falling export demand and commodity prices placed massive downward pressures on wages. Further, unemployment reached a record high of 29% with incidents of civil unrest becoming common.
4. Irving Fisher argued that the main factors leading to the Great Depression were overindebtedness and deflation. Fisher tied loose credit to over-indebtedness, which fueled speculation and asset bubbles. He then outlined 9 factors interacting with one another under conditions of debt and deflation to create the mechanics of boom to bust. The chain of events proceeded as follows:

Debt liquidation and distress selling
Contraction of the money supply as bank loans are paid off
A fall in the level of asset prices
A still greater fall in the net worths of business, precipitating bankruptcies
A fall in profits
A reduction in output, in trade and in employment.
Pessimism and loss of confidence
Hoarding of money
A fall in nominal interest rates and a rise in deflation adjusted interest rates

During the Crash of 1929 preceding the Great Depression, margin lending requirements were only 10%.

(*The equivalent now maybe what was considered "new" financial products, low doc, 90%+ and NINJA home loans)

In 1929-1935, when the market fell, the rate of loan defaults increased. Banks began to fail as debtors defaulted on debt and depositors attempted to withdraw their deposits en masse, triggering multiple bank runs. Government guarantees and Federal Reserve banking regulations to prevent such panics were ineffective . Outstanding debts became heavier, because prices and incomes fell by 20–50% but the debts remained at the same dollar amount. In all, 9,000 banks failed during the 1930s. By April 1933, around $7 billion in deposits had been frozen in failed banks or those left unlicensed after the March Bank Holiday.

Bank failures snowballed as desperate bankers called in loans which the borrowers did not have time or money to repay. With future profits looking poor, capital investment and construction slowed or completely ceased. In the face of bad loans and worsening future prospects, the surviving banks became even more conservative in their lending. Banks built up their capital reserves and made fewer loans, which intensified deflationary pressures. A vicious cycle developed and the downward spiral accelerated.

The liquidation of debt could not keep up with the fall of prices which it caused. The mass effect of the stampede to liquidate increased the value of each dollar owed, relative to the value of declining asset holdings. The very effort of individuals to lessen their burden of debt effectively increased it. Paradoxically, the more the debtors paid, the more they owed. This self-aggravating process turned a 1930 recession into a 1933 great depression.

Macroeconomists including Ben Bernanke, the current chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, have revived the debt-deflation view of the Great Depression originated by Fisher.

(unfortunately definitions of unemployment have changed a great deal and are no longer comparable over multi-decade periods. It would be interesting to see what adjusted figures are for official unemployment today if it was 20% under the 1930's definition)
 
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It is interesting to see that almost everyone (media and politicians) is saying that this is not going to be like the great depression when actually there is an amazing amount of simmilarity between the current situation and the 1930's. Like in that era, there was a big increase in household and business leverage and great confidence that crissis could be averted by policy measures.

I think there is a possibility that things may have changed in an irreversible way in the last year and that they maybe quite different in the next 15 years to what they were in the previous 15. We now have a worldwide economic downturn with likely recessions in 2009 for US, EURO, Japan, China, basically everywhere, except perhaps australia and one or 2 other countries

Zooming back in history (using wiki's description of the great depression) : what is missing except Smoot-Hawley, protectionism and war ? Maybe that is for later.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Depression

1. The Great Depression was a worldwide economic downturn
2. The Great Depression originated in the United States due to stock market revaluations from 1929
3. structural factors such as massive bank failures were significant
4. Massive increases in deficit spending, new banking regulation, and boosting farm prices did start turning the U.S. economy around, but it was a very slow and painful process. The U.S. had not returned to 1929's GNP for over a decade and still had an unemployment rate of about 15% in 1940 — down from 25% in 1933.
- Hoover launched a series of programs to increase farm prices, which failed, expanded federal spending in public works such as dams, and launched the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) which aided cities, banks and railroads, and continued as a major agency under the New Deal. To provide unemployment relief he set up the Emergency Relief Agency (ERA) that operated until 1935 as the Federal Emergency Relief Agency. Quarter by quarter the economy went downhill, as prices, profits and employment fell, leading to the political realignment in 1932 that brought to power the New Deal.
5. Australia's dependence on agricultural and industrial exports meant it was eventually one of the hardest-hit countries in the Western world. Falling export demand and commodity prices placed massive downward pressures on wages. Further, unemployment reached a record high of 29% with incidents of civil unrest becoming common.
4. Irving Fisher argued that the main factors leading to the Great Depression were overindebtedness and deflation. Fisher tied loose credit to over-indebtedness, which fueled speculation and asset bubbles. He then outlined 9 factors interacting with one another under conditions of debt and deflation to create the mechanics of boom to bust. The chain of events proceeded as follows:

Debt liquidation and distress selling
Contraction of the money supply as bank loans are paid off
A fall in the level of asset prices
A still greater fall in the net worths of business, precipitating bankruptcies
A fall in profits
A reduction in output, in trade and in employment.
Pessimism and loss of confidence
Hoarding of money
A fall in nominal interest rates and a rise in deflation adjusted interest rates

During the Crash of 1929 preceding the Great Depression, margin lending requirements were only 10%.

(*The equivalent now maybe what was considered "new" financial products, low doc, 90%+ and NINJA home loans)

In 1929-1935, when the market fell, the rate of loan defaults increased. Banks began to fail as debtors defaulted on debt and depositors attempted to withdraw their deposits en masse, triggering multiple bank runs. Government guarantees and Federal Reserve banking regulations to prevent such panics were ineffective . Outstanding debts became heavier, because prices and incomes fell by 20–50% but the debts remained at the same dollar amount. In all, 9,000 banks failed during the 1930s. By April 1933, around $7 billion in deposits had been frozen in failed banks or those left unlicensed after the March Bank Holiday.

Bank failures snowballed as desperate bankers called in loans which the borrowers did not have time or money to repay. With future profits looking poor, capital investment and construction slowed or completely ceased. In the face of bad loans and worsening future prospects, the surviving banks became even more conservative in their lending. Banks built up their capital reserves and made fewer loans, which intensified deflationary pressures. A vicious cycle developed and the downward spiral accelerated.

The liquidation of debt could not keep up with the fall of prices which it caused. The mass effect of the stampede to liquidate increased the value of each dollar owed, relative to the value of declining asset holdings. The very effort of individuals to lessen their burden of debt effectively increased it. Paradoxically, the more the debtors paid, the more they owed. This self-aggravating process turned a 1930 recession into a 1933 great depression.

Macroeconomists including Ben Bernanke, the current chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, have revived the debt-deflation view of the Great Depression originated by Fisher.

(unfortunately definitions of unemployment have changed a great deal and are no longer comparable over multi-decade periods. It would be interesting to see what adjusted figures are for official unemployment today if it was 20% under the 1930's definition)

Gee someone who actually takes the time to understand what has happened before. Do you think that maybe there is something to be learned from this brilliant post:D
 
The truth of the answer is we wont know until this period has passed and the accademics have time to study it.

Even if there are similarities, there is also the issue of degree of similarity, both in terms of severity and in terms of its application in a global world.
 
Something to ponder (particularly in light of the many comparisons being made between now and the Great Depression):

"In the Great Depression, actual GDP dropped by 30 per cent. Ben Bernanke was correct in remarks he made last week that there is “an order of magnitude” (ten-fold) difference between the current downturn and the Great Depression. For the record, the worst overall drawdowns in GDP since the Depression – not just bad quarterly growth rates – were in 1954 (-2.65 per cent), 1958 (-3.75 per cent), 1975 (-3.10 per cent), and 1982 (-2.87 per cent)."

This is not to minimise the prospects for a further economic downturn, but to say that this is “the worst economy since the Great Depression” is like blowing up a crate of dynamite on the Nevada Proving Grounds and saying it is the worst explosion since the detonation of the atomic bomb there. Even if the statement is accurate, the comparison is absurd.


See: Mark Carnegie, "The Princess Di Effect", Business Spectator, 12 December 2008.


However, it is more like the start of a Depression based on Martin Amstrong's definition, since there is a strong move to reduce debts around the world (central banks excluded).

PS. Based on the Austrian school of economic: Depression = Recession + Deleveraging. We are at the door steps of a Depression.

In reply to Kenster:

Well the Austrians and co. are entitled to their points of view.

By any chance, is anyone familiar with Francis Fulford - star, come host of, of "The ****ing Fulfords" and "Why England's ****ed"?

A quotation attributed to him is:

“Crisis point? I wouldn’t call this a crisis point. One of my ancestors was hung, drawn and quartered in 1463. That’s what I call a ****ing crisis point.”

Well, to paraphrase:

“Depression? I wouldn’t call this a depression. Last time we had a depression, GDP fell 10%, unemployment approached 30% and tens of thousands of people wandered the country looking for work. That’s what I call a ****ing depression.”

Those figures are as attributed to the Australian economy on Wikipedia. The US figures, fwiw, were a fall in GDP of around 25% and 20% unemployment. The Austrian's can point to all the deleveraging they want - imho it's when people start to really hurt through massive job losses arising from a huge fall in GDP that we enter a depression-like scenario. To date, based on what we know, we are not headed for that.
 
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Want to know what a depression actually looks like, then imagine this:

Effects of depression in the United States:

  • 13 million people became unemployed. In 1932, 34 million people belonged to families with no regular full-time wage earner.
  • Industrial production fell by nearly 45% between the years 1929 and 1932.
  • Homebuilding dropped by 80% between the years 1929 and 1932.
  • In the 1920s, the banking system in the U.S. was about $50 billion, which was about 50% of GDP.
  • From the years 1929 to 1932, about 5,000 banks went out of business.
  • By 1933, 11,000 of the US' 25,000 banks had failed.
  • Between 1929 and 1933, U.S. GDP fell around 30%, the stock market lost almost 90% of its value.
  • In 1929, the unemployment rate averaged 3%.
  • In 1933, 25% of all workers and 37% of all nonfarm workers were unemployed.
  • In Cleveland, Ohio, the unemployment rate was 60%; in Toledo, Ohio, 80%.
  • One Soviet trading corporation in New York averaged 350 applications a day from Americans seeking jobs in the Soviet Union.
  • Over one million families lost their farms between 1930 and 1934.
  • Corporate profits had dropped from $10 billion three years ago to $1billion in 1932.
  • Between 1929 and 1932 the income of the average American family was reduced by 40%.
  • Nine million savings accounts had been wiped out between 1930 and 1933.
  • 273,000 families had been evicted from their homes in 1932.
  • There were two million homeless people migrating around the country.
  • One Arkansas man walked 900 miles looking for work.
  • Over 60% of Americans were categorized as poor by the federal government in 1933.
  • In the last prosperous year (1929), there were 279,678 immigrants recorded, but in 1933 only 23,068 came to the U.S.
  • In the early 1930s, more people emigrated from the United States than immigrated to it.
  • New York social workers reported that 25% of all schoolchildren were malnourished. In the mining counties of West Virginia, Illinois, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania, the proportion of malnourished children was perhaps as high as 90%.
  • Many people became ill with diseases such as tuberculosis (TB).
  • The 1930 U.S. Census determined the U.S. population to be 122,775,046. About 40% of the population was under 20 years
.
 
In the Great Depression, actual GDP dropped by 30 per cent.
:


This annoys me, the use of GDP as a measure of almost anything
.
What percentage of GDP was services in 1929? I have no idea, but I bet it was nothing like 70% as it is today. I would guess it may have been lucky to have been 25%. Agriculture was probably 20% [3% today].

80 years ago, primary industry would have been huge compared to today. Secondary industry also much bigger, and the services industry tiny.
Primary and secondary industries are wealth producing. Service industries are wealth consuming.

It is such a useless statistic to use when measuring a slow down. And especially so if comparing one from 80 years ago. Forget GDP, which is mostly services, and measure the slowdown of real wealth generating industries and it will give a more meaningfull statistic.

The increase in efficiency over 80 years in primary and secondary industry has allowed most people today to be employed in services. 75% of the workforce is employed in services. GDP is almost meaningless in the example you used to measure a slowdown.

If GDP dropped by 30% in the great depression, then today it would have to drop by much much less, considering services makes up 70% of GDP, and employs 75% of the workforce.

See ya's.



ps. Just remember i have no education in economics whatsoever.
 
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TC

Just a minor point. About 90 percent of the people involved in getting ore out of the ground are classified as services.

Engineering consultants to design the mine. Consultants to project manage construction phase. Acommodation service providers to house the workers. Caterers to feed the shifts. Accountants to count the dollars. Traders to sell the ore to Japan. Procurement to buy tyres so the yellow toys can keep running. Engineers to run models to maximise tyre life.

Even actual mining is considered a service these days - half the mines are done by mining services contractors like Thiess.
 
TC

Even actual mining is considered a service these days - half the mines are done by mining services contractors like Thiess.


Are you sure..??

Mining is a primary industry along with agriculture and fishing.

These service industries to mining then? Surely they would be regarded as secondary industries then, along with manufacturing and construction..?? Maybe the accountants and stuff are services.

Dunno, as I said, no education in economics, but I sure as hell know that using GDP as a measure of growth or lack of is deluding yourself.

See ya's.
 
To be honest I don't really know how economists categorise these things but I bet you the "services" basket covers a lot of things that we would normally not consider to be services.

To put it into context - is a farrier counted as a service? I bet it is.
 
In reply to Kenster:
Well, to paraphrase:

“Depression? I wouldn’t call this a depression. Last time we had a depression, GDP fell 10%, unemployment approached 30% and tens of thousands of people wandered the country looking for work. That’s what I call a ****ing depression.”

Last week GDP growth of germany was -2.1% in the 4th quarter alone link
GDP growth for Europe -1.5% 4th quarter alone link
then you had US that in the advance GDP growth was at -3.8% at the end of the year (annualised), the gdp annualised at end of 3rd quarter was -0.5%
On monday the Japan 4th quarter growth data is coming out and market are expecting -3.1% for the quarter alone (was -0.5% in 3rd quarter). link.
Pretty much you need a year like that and you have the depression you are talking about.
 
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do you have an idea what are the latest GDP growth report before you write this f***ing useless post? .

My bad.

Stupidly, I thought that by pointing out the patently obvious differences between the great depression and where we are now, that people might realise we're not even close to a great depression type scenario.

How very niave of me.
 
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Gee guys lets all look on the positive side.
Global industries crashing...high unemployment....recession lesson..
wow, but hey.
On the flip side GLOBAL WARMING is reduced.
Now that's gotta be good news:D
 
On the flip side GLOBAL WARMING is reduced.
Now that's gotta be good news

The rate of global warming acceleration will be slowed if people are driving their cars less, using less power (subject to it's source), etc.

But the weight of scientific opinion is that even if we ceased emission of all GHG's tommorrow the earth would still warm for decades owing to the damage already done.
 
do you have an idea what are the latest GDP growth report before you write this f***ing useless post?

You're not normally so angry Boz. This isn't like you. You said something similarly nasty about one of my threads yesterday, which I thought was quite out of character for you, but this is even worse. Where did all this anger come from... did your currency gambles go wrong? Spending too much time on-line with negative people? Something else?

Cheers,

Shadow.
 
You're not normally so angry Boz. This isn't like you. You said something similarly nasty about one of my threads yesterday, which I thought was quite out of character for you, but this is even worse. Where did all this anger come from... did your currency gambles go wrong? Spending too much time on-line with negative people? Something else?

Cheers,

Shadow.

Sorry Shadow, you are right, I am a bit rough and grumpy, I've been doing very well with my investment, It's probably got to do a bit with family problems...
Anyway, I spend a lot of time studying the markets and economys and thinking about possible scenarios and I get a bit emotional when I read about getting to conclusions without support of data. Mark can be right and we might not get a depression, but I wouldn't think we have high chances of a depression scenario coming up.
In any case the government response to the chrisis is different then in the 30's and I think the outcome will be different and not necessary better, in particular the imploding risk of some country is much higher then in the 30's where not many country was imploding (globalisation and speed of money is the major risk to a Iceland kind of imploding scenario).
 
GDP contraction in US Q4 was 4% but take out inventory pileup and it would have been -5.8%. Which is huge. Their economy is falling off a cliff and -20% to -30% over the next 4 years would not be surprising. I suspect the australian economy is lagged but will do the same. So does the government I guess, with the bail/handouts.

It is very simmillar to the US actually but lagged by 12 months, which makes sense as the commodities are down the pipe from both the consumers (US) and the producers (China- it too is falling off a cliff and may actually post near zero or negative final quarter growth this year). The US too had a phase of tax cuts and handouts. Is it a long pipe or has our economy miraculously escaped any damage as everywhere else implodes ? Time will tell.

In fact the sharemarket has priced this in. The real estate market has not yet, but there is no way you can profit from this what I consider to be a likely scenario as the Listed property trusts have already gone down 70% so not a high probability game shorting that from here. Other than selling physical property but you would have done that by now if you were pessimistic.

Everyone thinks that rents are immune to going down in this deflation. I am not so confident of that. When the income side is affected... well that is hard to imagine after the last 5 years, but easier to imagine when it happens.
 
GDP contraction in US Q4 was 4% .
.

You missed out the word annualised.

(Which is kinda an important word)

The US economy did not contract by 4% in Q4 2008.

Real gross domestic product -- the output of goods and services produced by labor and property, located in the United States -- decreased at an annual rate of 3.8 percent in the fourth quarter of 2008, (that is, from the third quarter to the fourth quarter), according to advance estimates released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. In the third quarter, real GDP decreased 0.5 percent.

See: US Bureau of Economic Analysis - GDP 4th Qtr (Advance)


I was unjustifiably criticised earlier in this thread for not using data to support a conclusion (I used a quote from Ben Bernanke to highlight the collossal difference in the economic contraction experienced thus far to that of the great depression).

But there's one thing worse than not using data or facts to support a conclusion - it is twisting and misquoting data and stats to support a conclusion.
 
Marc, I think it is assumed by everyone that GDP numbers are reported as an annualised rate. The rate of change is from 4% growth to -4% (worse really with inventory).

What I am saying is that is a big change in a year, and it is quite plausible that at this rate the US economy will contract -20% over a 5 year or 10 year period. More likely it will be stretched out perhaps over 10 years, with a few false starts. Which is what happened in Japan. Japan, although it is cited as a bad case scenario, is actually a good case scenario.

Things are remarkable currently, there has never been a nationwide decline in real estate prices in the US since the great depression and now it's down 15%. In the UK maybe 20% yoy. Interestingly houseprices only fell 15% in real terms during the great depression in the US. They have already fallen more than they did in the great depression !! Arguably real estate was not as overvalued before the great depression but stocks were (stocks fell 90%). Anyway it is hard to imagine how much pain US homeowners are in from over here, but it maybe easier to imagine when it happens here !

I read a study on banking crissis. Taking average as a good scenario, on average the stockmarket falls 50% and real estate falls 30% from peak.

It is why it is going to be very hard or impossible to fiscally stimulate out of it. The funny thing is that the central bankers and politicians think they have the tools and when they pull them out it doesn't work ! Zero interest rates have been tried in Japan and the US. Ben thinks helicoptering money will work, but quantitive easing was not very successful in Japan either. The only thing that does seem to be effective is flushing out the losses early and letting insolvent institutions die, but this is actually the reverse of what is currently being done with the bailouts.

I think there is always the assumption that there will be an easy solution to overindebtedness and there may not be.
 
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