Navra claimed to have done well in 87, however 08 was a very different outcome for him and his clients.
I think managing your own money is a very very different exercise to managing someone else's money - completely different set of issues and risk profile.
Also consider the extra-ordinary forces at play which dictated a lot of the investment decisions and advice - specifically the collapse of Great Southern and the attempt to recover losses incurred there.
While I liked the trading mechanism of the NavraInvest fund and its ability to generate income - it did come with a downside that once the market fell far enough, it would be fully invested and just a passenger on any further downward ride until things started turning around and it was able to start selling at a profit again.
But that was always a known possibility for the fund. Of course, trading parameters were set based on an assumption that the market would only fall by so much, which turned out to be completely invalid assumptions, but even so - there was never a magic solution - like pretty much every other fund out there, it would just have to ride out the downturn. The potential upside when the market eventually turned around was what was exciting.
Hoever, where things started to go really badly for everyone was when the decision was made to sell out and move the fund to 100% cash.
The fund was allowed to be in 100% cash - but it was never intended for this to happen in a down market - the 100% cash mechanism was for a raging bull market which allowed the fund to sell out progressively as the market went up, realising profits and distributing income - and then buying back in when the market dipped again.
So not only did the fund manager decide to break the fundamental trading mechanism of the fund - their caution lead them to delay buying back in until well after the market had started rising again, further delaying any potential recovery and exacerbating the problems that the non-trading fund had produced (namely, no income distributions).
While it was publically denied, I'm pretty sure that the decision to move to cash was a mechanism to protect the funds under management of the fund manager.
Since a large percentage of the investors of the fund were NFS clients and their strategy was to leverage into the fund using margin loans and warrants, once the fund value dropped far enough, massive margin calls would be made - thus decimating the value of the funds under management (and further, any future trail commissions for the planners!).
While you could possibly rationalise the decision as a purely defensive one on the part of the fund manager - to minimise the downside in a market which nobody knew how far would fall - the external factor of protecting funds under management from being wiped out by margin calls, does make you question the validity (and independence) of such decisions.
So while I did like the trading mechanism - I was disappointed that we were never given the opportunity to see what the fund could really do in a massively down market.
Either way - it was just theoretical for me, I had sold out of the fund not that long after the market started its down-trend and so was just a spectator for the worst of the market - watching the horror unfold with a morbid fascination like the proverbial train-wreck.