Mortgage Meltdown ABC 4 Corners Monday night

The reason studies have been done on a section of Amsterdam city is that
the area is protected and has not been redeveloped. The houses are the very same ones built 350 years ago and still in every day use as homes.
It provides a very interesting insight into grow of the exact same asset over a very long period of time.
Amsterdam is of course a large successful European city.
We had a thread about Herengracht - House prices rise at 0.2% above inflation in the long term (400 yrs)
 
I think this is far too simplified. You only have to look at Mandurah which is the fastest growing town in Australia - huge pop growth, construction going on everywhere, new infrastructure you name it. Unfortunately there is no scarcity value on the property tho... if you want to rent one and the owner wants too much, just move onto the next on the list. The Perth boom has been really intersting... the ripple moved out to the growth suburbs, now the growth suburbs have stopped in their tracks and it is the western suburbs and select coastal property that is going gangbusters. For me it demonstrates just beautifully the true value of what happens when there is restricted supply and strong demand. Karratha is the ultimate example - and that cap growth isn't because of the tree lined streets and good schools!

Quite agree with you. I was referring to capital cities. Bill Zheng came up with an excellent comment about cash flow positive properties in rural/mining towns. Paraphrasing his comment, he basically said that many cash flows positive properties have experienced capital gains due to reduced rental yields rather than increases in the underlying economic value of the property.
 
Paraphrasing his comment, he basically said that many cash flows positive properties have experienced capital gains due to reduced rental yields rather than increases in the underlying economic value of the property.

I don't understand this... does anyone else?
 
Let me explain by example:
Propety investor 1: buys a property for $100K with rents of $15K so the yield is 15%. After say a year many investors hear about positive geared real estate in rurual areas and so start buying. Buyer competition means that new buyers are prepared to pay $200k because even at $200K the yield is 7.5%.
Thus the price of the property has 'doubled' because of yield contraction not because the actual underlying value.
 
http://www.irrationalexuberance.com/




Irrational Exuberance, Second Edition
by Robert J. Shiller This site offers updated information relating to the book Irrational Exuberance by Robert J. Shiller.

I have a March 2005 study "The Life-Cycle Personal Accounts Proposal for Social Security: An Evaluation" [PDF Version | Word Document Version] that reports calculations in a spreadsheet containing historical data to assess the returns to investments in the life-cycle personal accounts. These personal accounts would invest heavily in the stock market for young workers, and gradually reduce exposure to stocks as the worker ages.

One can access an Excel file with the data set (used and described in the book) on stock prices, earnings, dividends and interest rates since 1871, updated.

One can access an Excel file with the data set (used and described in the book) on home prices, building costs, population and interest rates since 1890, updated.

The Yale School of Management produces Stock Market Confidence Indexes which reveal changing attitudes among individual and institutional investors over time.

The definition of "irrational exuberance" has its origin in a speech Alan Greenspan gave on December 5, 1996.

I write a monthly column "Finance in the 21st Century" for Project Syndicate, with coverage around the world, and this column contains further development of some themes in the book.

Richard Thaler and I have organized a number of scholarly workshops in behavioral finance that are the source of many themes in the book.

I testified on Household Reactions to Changes in Housing Wealth [PDF Version | Word Document Version] before the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System at the Academic Consultants Meeting, January 30, 2004.
In my 2007 presidential address for the Eastern Economic Association I compared historic turning points in real estate with the situation in today's markets.
 

Attachments

  • Fig2.1Shiller(1).xls
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Basically prices rose because people were willing to accept a smaller yield.

The whole country has that problem!

It went from:

someone pays me to live in my house

to

someone pays only a little bit to live in my house

to

I'll pay for someone to live in my house!
 
Risk and Yields

Let me explain by example:
Propety investor 1: buys a property for $100K with rents of $15K so the yield is 15%. After say a year many investors hear about positive geared real estate in rurual areas and so start buying. Buyer competition means that new buyers are prepared to pay $200k because even at $200K the yield is 7.5%.
Thus the price of the property has 'doubled' because of yield contraction not because the actual underlying value.

I think what you mean is the required return to hold the asset (the yield required) has dropped so the value to buy it has increased. This makes sense. But you have to ask yourself - why has the required yield dropped? In your example it used to be 15% but then suddenly people are happy to accept 7.5% ... what has changed?

In a rational market the required return would only drop if the risk in holding the asset dropped for some reason. If a company reduced its risk (its volatility on earnings) but kept its average earnings constant then the price of its shares would go up (i.e. same return, lower risk = higher price to buy). This makes sense.

But this is what is strange about property. As far as I can tell the risk hasn't changed a bit but people are accepting lower, and lower, and lower yields. To the point now where they think property has less risk than a bank term deposit!
 
But this is what is strange about property. As far as I can tell the risk hasn't changed a bit but people are accepting lower, and lower, and lower yields. To the point now where they think property has less risk than a bank term deposit!
There's a pervasive perception that inflation risk has reduced due to RBA interventions. This translates into reduced risk of interest rate hikes which reduces the risk of loan servicing fluctuations.

As such, the risk has reduced significantly for this asset class. Add to that heightened workforce participation and you get reduced risk of your cash flows drying up.

So, reduced risk of rate rises coupled with more gaurantee of income allows the acceptable yields on property to drop significantly.

Whether or not the actual risk of these factors is aligned with the perceived risk of these factors is what seems to be being debated. I believe that they are more stable than some of the doomsayers suggest.

Cheers,
Michael.
 
If the expected capital gains increases, people are willing to take lower yields. A rising market creates a virtuous cycle that means increased capital gains makes people more willing to drop yield requirements to buy, which increases prices resulting in more capital gains.

Of course, eventually this can't be sustained and you have a bust. The bust then leads people to think capital gains won't happen again (mid-late 90s) and they don't buy. People who buy for yield are then pleasantly surprised when capital gains kicks off again.

That's why I tend to expect a 'normal' level of yield (less than the interest rate, but not much) and a 'normal' level of CG.
Alex
 
That's why I tend to expect a 'normal' level of yield (less than the interest rate, but not much)...
Yep,

Me too. In fact I posted about that some time ago and coined it my tipping point hypothesis. I conjectured that at some point the differential between the prevailing interest rate and the yields achievable on property will close to the point that investors for growth will flow back into the market, the "tipping point". From there we roll into a boom cycle until irrational exuberance makes that differential too great and it takes time for rents to catch up and the next tipping point to be achieved.

All just conjecture, and it needed to be positioned within the greater macro-economic environment, but a useful way of looking at things nonetheless.

Cheers,
Michael.
 
Some interesting points

The conversation may have moved on from the relevance of my post but some may still find it of interest.

At the Sydney Mortgage Brokers Forum last week Shane Lee from Citigroup spoke on the US market and the effects, I jotted down what I thought were interesting points.

- the effect of the subprime issue IS now costing banks 15 basis points ( ie 0.15% in interest rate) in costs ( ie them buying money so far this has been absorbed)
- the effect on Mortgage Managers is 40 basis points

- There is no subprime market in Australia however it represents 305 of US lending
- Of these loans 15% are currently outstanding
- The Alt -A loans market in US represents 15% of lending - this is a comparable product to our Low Doc lending which represents 6% of Australian lending
- In Australia defaults are about 1% in US 2% for all lending and 15% for subprime

His estimate waas that the major subprime meltdown will occur in 6 mths and this is when the Reserve Bank will make their move Quarter 1 2008, nothing is needed sooner as the credit market is already slowing things down. I my opionion there may be more lenders that move themselves rather than see their profit reduced sooner ( ie as per Macquaries recent move)

He then went on to discuss Aust growth, Asia/India etc and construction.

Hope you find it interesting, I did.

Jane Slack-Smith
 
His estimate waas that the major subprime meltdown will occur in 6 mths and this is when the Reserve Bank will make their move Quarter 1 2008, nothing is needed sooner as the credit market is already slowing things down.

What move by the RBA is he predicting?
Alex
 
Once again these are his thoughts:-

In 6 mths time the real effect of the subprime market will be felt, he has unemployment at 4.3% and inflation pressure being the main cause. The Aus GDP he has at 4.3% 07 4.3% 08 and 4.7% 09, belief that there will be a pickup in trade due to a recovery from the drought, the terms of trade will improve due to Port expansions and improvement and continual growth in China (11%)

Hope this helps
Jane
 
Forgive me if my thoughts process is simplistic but....

- if the credit squeeze cost banks to move interest rates up, doesn't this just save the RBA from doing it themslves.

- if rates go up too much because of a credit squeeze, won't the RBA just reduce the cash rate to compensate.

The RBA wants inflation at 2-3% and the interest rates for end uses will reflect that.
 
The credit crunch will slow economic activity, which generally decreases inflation. Except that's not the only component of inflation: food prices and oil prices are a concern. Theoretically you can have oil-induced inflation even if the economy is in recession. But that's about the only scenario I can think of where the RBA would increase rates in a credit crunch.

Not that the RBA needs to. The big banks still have 0.6%, 0.7% of 'discount' they can get rid of.
Alex
 
Just my two cents worth:
The answer is very easy:....
wait for it....
....
IT DEPENDS

Just like most investments there is no black/white answer. Investors are always looking to the holly grail of solutions. The truth is there can never be a single answer. Even if there was a perfect answer at a particular point in time, market forces would re-act causing that answer to be wrong in a future point in time.

I think at the end of the day look to Jan Sommer's book, if you can afford it keep it, if you cant reduce debt until you are comfortable with YOUR OWN financial situation.
For myself i look at the following:
1) Am i financially ok if property doesnt increase for the next 10 yrs, ie can i afford repayments without resorting to future refinancing on capital appreciation
2) Whats my net rental yield against interest on debt. If the variance is only a couple of % points and the interest rate is fixed long term (ie 10yrs), then im not to fussed.
3) How satisfactory is my return is i assume long term capital appreciation of 5 - 6%. Generally i try to get a return of 20%+ per pa but with the assumption of capital and rental growth of 5.5% return. If i can make the figures 'stack up' at this rate, any higher rate is 'just icing on the cake'.
4) What is the population movement. If its going up in an area property prices will increase and conversely.

Its very difficult to accurately predict the future so why bother. If i can achieve a good return using basic conservative variables then there is no need to over analysise.

Just my two cents worth.

Hi chilliaa,

I enjoyed your post above. I am inclined to agree with your thoughts above. I have read so much information this week on the credit crunch, and based on this information alone it could be tempting to go and sell everything and put my cash under a matress. (Mind you capital gains tax would eat into it!).

I remember reading in Jan's books where she gave numerous examples over the past couple of decades where the validity of investing in IP's was questioned by economists and financial commentators. A few spring to mind:

1) The introduction of the GST
2) The Asian crisis - 1997 (Or there abouts)
2) The recession in 1987
2) The oil crisis in the 70's

(And since Jan's books have been published 9/11).

Unfortunately I don't have the book in front of me, but the list was very extensive - perhaps others can add to my feeble attempt!

The jist of her point was that throughout history when times have gotten a little tough the financial gurus and commentators have all questioned property investment, and it's ability to rise in value in the future. After each of the events above property went on to perform very strongly.

I would be interested in other's ideas. My post is extremely simplistic without economic analysis. Please feel free to add!

Regards Jason.
 
Bill Zheng came up with an excellent comment about cash flow positive properties in rural/mining towns. Paraphrasing his comment, he basically said that many cash flows positive properties have experienced capital gains due to reduced rental yields rather than increases in the underlying economic value of the property.

That isn't how I understood it. What I believe he said is that growth is determined/driven by scarcity, and regional and mining towns experience capital growth due to the scarcity of 'high yield', rather than scarcity of the properties fundamentals (style/land/location/access to infrastructure).

"many cash flows positive properties have experienced capital gains due to reduced rental yields" - this doesn't make sense IMO.

Me too. In fact I posted about that some time ago and coined it my tipping point hypothesis. I conjectured that at some point the differential between the prevailing interest rate and the yields achievable on property will close to the point that investors for growth will flow back into the market, the "tipping point". From there we roll into a boom cycle until irrational exuberance makes that differential too great and it takes time for rents to catch up and the next tipping point to be achieved.

This 'kinda' reminds me of Steve Navra's rental reality. Hired Goon, I reckon you should check that out. I think you'll like it and I'd be really interested to see what you think of it. http://www.invested.com.au/75/rental-reality-3104/

Synopsis

The theory of rental reality is based on choosing investment properties that suit the income levels of prospective renters in the region you are considering. Tenants care little about interest rate increases / decreases, inflation or market emotion. Tenants care mostly about their individual level of affordability. It thus makes sense to base our method of property valuation on this factor. This article describes the theory and shows you how to calculate the value of a property based on rental reality.
 
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