So you think it's easy?
An interesting thread on HC. This is a reply by a working, professional economist to an article in The Economist recently which insists the US$ is overvalued............
Based on that article, the US$ has already fallen from 0.9 to ~1.3 against the Euro since 2001 (down >40%).
Against the Yen, it has fallen from 130 to today's 105 (down 20%).
The Eurozone, however, is currently at risk of slipping back into recession, and has never really recovered from its post-2001 circumstances.
Also, the matter of Greece falsifying or fudging its deficit figures in order to come within the 3% deficit ceiling for Euro management purposes, is quite worrying.
As for A$ consequences, these are relatively simple to discern:
1.
higher A$ towards 90c;
2.
improving foreign debt situation when measured in A$ terms (ie: US$400B in foreign debt @70c translates to A$571B, but at 90c, translates to A$444B);
3.
deteriorating current account /trade deficits (no prospect whatsoever here for the trade account to go into surplus);
4.
import substitution for domestically produced goods resulting in a possibsle reduction in domestic economic activity;
5.
increased profit warnings by any company trading overseas;
6.
re-location of more Australian businesses overseas;
7.
relaxation of pressure on domestic interest rates (due theorectically to the lower priced imports); and
8.
a clash by mid-2005 between a rampaging A$, a deteriorating rural sector, and a slowing domestic economy (circa, possible domestic recession by late 2005, early 2006);
9.
alternatively, a currency under siege by mid-2005 once foreign support for the A$ slips away, and global circumstances dictate.
Our current account deficit is already much higher than that of the USA measured in GDP terms. Trouble is, ours is growing faster than the USA, whilst apart from our commodity based past, we have little else with which to cushion the deficit going forward.
Prognosis - the US$ may well continue to fall (due to manipulation and determination rather than to the interaction of differing market forces). But the US economy still accounts for >25% of global economic output whilst the Eurozone /EU share of global economic output is starting to shrink.
All the best,
Grant62
A Q from an eminantly sane poster;
G'day all
Grant thanks for your reply. Seems its always a balancing act that is very difficult to manage, usually resulting in an overbalance one way then the other.
cheers
Grant's repl was:
Hi Rod,
Normally, I would agree with you. In this instance, however, the RBA seems intent on not wanting to take interest rates higher (ie: operating off the back of benevolent inflation numbers rather than protecting the competitive value of the A$).
A higher A$ thus feeds (all things being equal) into a lower overall price mix due to import replacement /substitution (etc). In those circumstances, the RBA could well be using lower priced imports to contain domestic pricing pressure.
In consequence of this, domestic producers potentially face the risk of having to adjust their domesyic prices to maintain a competitive balance. In classical terms, this is how some could view price deflation being imported into another country.
Short term, a higher A$ takes the heat off interest rates having to be raised in order to either cool the economy, reduce inflation risks, or facilitate balanced growth.
Medium term, however, such a strategy is fraught with danger. Further deterioration in the current account deficit will eventually reach the stage where things will have to reverse themselves. This will either occur through some sort of dollar shock, or through having to adjust interest rates.
Trouble is, adjusting interest rates in those circumstances will likely lead to an even more adverse dollar situation (ie: a rising A$).
The RBA is thus playing a rather dangerous game here.
In the circumstances, they are trying to engineer a soft landing for interest rates and for the A$ which is dependent upon the following:
1.
domestic timing (ie: time in order for the heat to be taken out of domestic lending, etc) - already, at risk;
2.
international timing (ie: time in order for the FED to catch up to neutrality) - somewhere in the 3-4% range.
The trouble is - the timing on 1. is shorter on the timing on 2 (ie: 3-6 months, as opposed to 6-12 months).
The RBA, therefore, is going to have to be very careful in what it does. Otherwise we could face the trifecta outcome of:
1.
a slowing in domestic economic activity (due to the adverse impact of a higher A$);
2.
rising interest rates (to curb speculative lending behaviour); and
3.
a currency cruch (if the A$ falls out of favour, or matters such as our own debt /deficit situation becomes more apparent).
Politically, this is arguably why the Howard Government seems intent on:
1.
not waiting until July 2005 in order to bring on and pass its contentious legislative reforms (ie: in industrial relations, etc);
2.
bringing into Parliament now (not later) most of its campaign promises;
3.
accelerating the move on T3 which (by all reckoning) should still be 18 months away.
All the best,
Grant62