Unemployment up to 5.3% (10 month high)

See you guys. Clearly I'm on Sim's blacklist on saying anything D&G.
Enjoy your property forum. Only positive property comments welcome.

When we were growing up, mum had a Hagar comic strip pinned up in the kitchen, that said something along the lines of "she'll never die... she's too afraid she might be missing something".
I think this is the 3rd time I've read that you are leaving this week! But I think, like my Hagar comic strip that you dont really want to go......
 
Talking about unemployment I found a 2007 paper by the Dallas Fed which says that one of the major mistakes that subprime lenders made was to assume that deliquencies will remain low as long as unemployment was low (bolding mine).

http://dallasfed.org/research/eclett/2007/el0711.html

Subprime loan problems had surfaced just before and at the start of the 2001 recession but then rapidly retreated from 2002 to 2005 as the economy recovered (Chart 3). This pre-2006 pattern suggested that as long as unemployment remained low, so, too, would default and delinquency rates.

This interpretation ignored two other factors that had helped alleviate subprime loan problems earlier in the decade. First, this was a period of rapidly escalating home prices.
Subprime borrowers who encountered financial problems could either borrow against their equity to make house payments or sell their homes to settle their debts. Second, interest rates declined significantly in the early 2000s. This helped lower the base rate to which adjustable mortgage rates were indexed, thereby limiting the increase when initial, teaser rates ended.

Favorable home-price and interest rate developments likely led models that were overly focused on unemployment as a driver of problem loans to underestimate the risk of nonprime mortgages. Indeed, swings in home-price appreciation and interest rates may also explain why prime and subprime loan quality have trended together in the 2000s. This can be seen once we account for the fact that past-due rates—the percentage of mortgages delinquent or in some stage of foreclosure—typically run five times higher on subprime loans (Chart 3). When the favorable home-price and interest rate factors reversed, the past-due rate rose markedly, despite continued low unemployment.

Failure to appreciate the risks of nonprime loans prompted lenders to overly ease credit standards.[3] The result was a huge jump in origination shares for subprime and near-prime mortgages.

I can't help but think:

America 2001 - Australia 2008 - initial scare
Subprime - FHB i.e. Rudd-Prime, government guarantees
Problems hidden by ultra-low interest rates and rapid house price acceleration (due to all the sub-prime/FHB)
America 2006/7 - Australia 2010/11 - flatlining prices, drops in construction activity, soaring inventory, banks loaded down with sub-prime/FHB loans (doesn't the post-GFC loans make up something like a quarter of the mortgages of some Australian banks?)
Next?

The article has some nice detailed graphs showing the deterioration in things like unsold inventory, house price growth rates and construction activity near the turning point for America.

Sure we have a commodity boom (though I suspect that won't last long), but America has the world's reserve currency i.e. cheap debt, no real danger of capital outflows.
 
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Some interesting thoughts - but your comparisons are right off.

Subprime was lending to borrowers who had no visible means to repay - erog the term NINJAS loans (no income, no job/assets/savings). FHB-ers might be mortgaged to the hilt, but they still had to jump to hoops to show that they could (at the time of application) they could pay the loan back. They also make up a small percentage of home owners, although a larger percentage of mortgage holders.

Interest rates are not at an all time low (ie, 0-1%). They are currently hovering a slight fraction under average. The Reserve Bank has a lot of ammo still up it's sleeve if required. As for the banks being "loaded down". Sure, banks always hold a larger proportion of new loans because the mortgagee "hasn't had a chance to pay it off". Quite simple really ... although term deposit rates are dropping as the banks also become loaded down with money.

Employment is around 5.5% - granted this is not "full employment" as many as either casual or part time and would like to be full time ... but nowhere near the real 20%+ of the USA.

There was not the massive overbuilding of entire estates that took place in the USA ... they would develop and 1,000's of houses at a time with no presales, and then try to sell them. Many of these are now being bulldozed.

Entire massive population centres are not losing their entire base of employment, ie, Detroit. Sure manufacturing is suffering badly in Australia, but that is because we need to darn well wake up to ourselves and realise we can't compete with the likes of Asia and India in cost ... we are a smart country and we need to manufacture "value added" products. This is starting to happen and our small size, and non reliance on traditional manufacturing, will make it easier to flex into these changes.

I personally am positive about Australia. I think we have the ability to, although we'll be hit, ride this negative period and come out stronger ... if only the Government would stop piddling around with sensationalism, make the decisions required and move on.
 
I think you are missing the whole point of the Fed report. They are discussing the situation *before* record unemployment i.e. the period when US employment was even better than Australian employment today and house prices started falling and defaults rising.

At the time the Dallas Fed wrote that article (Nov 2007), unemployment in the US was only 4.7%. Which was a lot better than the current unemployment rate in Australia. In fact during the turning point period when house prices started stagnating and defaults started rising, unemployment actually *fell* in America from 5.0% in 2005 to a low of 4.4% in mid-2007.

In fact belief in the fallacy that high unemployment is needed to cause a housing downturn rather than the other way around was one of the reasons for the problems in the US. As the Dallas Fed paper points out, the banks built in to their risk models the assumption that as long as unemployment remained low defaults would as well. Their risk models collapsed when defaults rose with rising interest rates and falling house prices (which prevented people from getting out at least even) even with low unemployment.

Also in terms of low interest rates, what the Fed was referring to was the period after 2001 recession to about 2004. Then in the US interest rates started rising and helped drive along the defaults. Hence the comparable period is actually 2008-2009 here when interest rates were all time lows.

FHB are not strictly subprime, but they are amongst the most vulnerable to default. They are usually on lower salaries, the least equity in their property, the least buffer, the first to get fired. Also, I think historically speaking, defaults peak 2-3 years after the loans are made, anyway, which would be right about now. Also remember being young - FHB usually don't have many assets anyway and so despite the loans being full recourse - well so what? If you have nothing, the banks can't take it. And remember they have low equity in their houses. Which tallies well with the American experience where subprime borrowers in full-recourse states were just as happy to throw the keys back to the bank. They also the most time to rebuild their finances after a default.

And I have strong suspicions about the quality of the loans. Being in the FHB age group myself I have lots of stories from friends who bought during that time about how easy it was to get loans, using the Boosted Grant as a deposit. And this included friends loaded down with other debt such as credit cards. Being from an immigrant background, I also know plenty of recent immigrants, working in fairly menial jobs (they don't speak English), who very easily got home loans in that period too.

The important thing is to look past the label "subprime" and think - did lots of people get loans in the post-GFC era who would have been highly unlikely to get loans using normal credit standards? Also how many buyers did the boost drive to buying before they were ready?

As for over-building - see Melbourne, the Dublin/California of Australia.


Some interesting thoughts - but your comparisons are right off.

Subprime was lending to borrowers who had no visible means to repay - erog the term NINJAS loans (no income, no job/assets/savings). FHB-ers might be mortgaged to the hilt, but they still had to jump to hoops to show that they could (at the time of application) they could pay the loan back. They also make up a small percentage of home owners, although a larger percentage of mortgage holders.

Interest rates are not at an all time low (ie, 0-1%). They are currently hovering a slight fraction under average. The Reserve Bank has a lot of ammo still up it's sleeve if required. As for the banks being "loaded down". Sure, banks always hold a larger proportion of new loans because the mortgagee "hasn't had a chance to pay it off". Quite simple really ... although term deposit rates are dropping as the banks also become loaded down with money.

Employment is around 5.5% - granted this is not "full employment" as many as either casual or part time and would like to be full time ... but nowhere near the real 20%+ of the USA.

There was not the massive overbuilding of entire estates that took place in the USA ... they would develop and 1,000's of houses at a time with no presales, and then try to sell them. Many of these are now being bulldozed.

Entire massive population centres are not losing their entire base of employment, ie, Detroit. Sure manufacturing is suffering badly in Australia, but that is because we need to darn well wake up to ourselves and realise we can't compete with the likes of Asia and India in cost ... we are a smart country and we need to manufacture "value added" products. This is starting to happen and our small size, and non reliance on traditional manufacturing, will make it easier to flex into these changes.

I personally am positive about Australia. I think we have the ability to, although we'll be hit, ride this negative period and come out stronger ... if only the Government would stop piddling around with sensationalism, make the decisions required and move on.
 
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FHB areas are definitely most prone to be hit.

Was just reading an American article on property. Places like Phoenix etc have fallen 50% plus. Manhattan condos have fallen around 10%. There's a reason for that, just as i've always been saying when the downturn comes (and it is probably in some Australian cities as I type based on several auctions I went yesterday), the outer suburbs will be hit hard.

Lucky for most investors, most people still have a job so cashflow continues not to be an issue as rent and mortgage repayments continue to be met. But if the economy falls such that cashflow is impacted, watch the fringe suburbs burn and crash.

In other thoughts though, the RBA does have a lot of room to wriggle in terms of interest rates. Another very expensive city that I've been studying religiously is my citizenship-based country, Hong Kong. And due to the government imposing very low rates (I can lock in 2.5% for 3 years now), apartments with 3-4% yield are not falling much - probably around 10%. Again it's a serviceability issue. In fact they have better serviceability than Australia, which is evident from the fact that all these investors are discounting their properties and trying to sell them (why would you do that unless you're cashflow hit...? You'd just hold, but you can't with 6.8% interest rates can you?)
 
FHB areas are definitely most prone to be hit.

Was just reading an American article on property. Places like Phoenix etc have fallen 50% plus. Manhattan condos have fallen around 10%. There's a reason for that, just as i've always been saying when the downturn comes (and it is probably in some Australian cities as I type based on several auctions I went yesterday), the outer suburbs will be hit hard.

Lucky for most investors, most people still have a job so cashflow continues not to be an issue as rent and mortgage repayments continue to be met. But if the economy falls such that cashflow is impacted, watch the fringe suburbs burn and crash.

In other thoughts though, the RBA does have a lot of room to wriggle in terms of interest rates. Another very expensive city that I've been studying religiously is my citizenship-based country, Hong Kong. And due to the government imposing very low rates (I can lock in 2.5% for 3 years now), apartments with 3-4% yield are not falling much - probably around 10%. Again it's a serviceability issue. In fact they have better serviceability than Australia, which is evident from the fact that all these investors are discounting their properties and trying to sell them (why would you do that unless you're cashflow hit...? You'd just hold, but you can't with 6.8% interest rates can you?)

Another reason why FHB areas are hit are they tend to be cheaper, less desirable areas. Typically in bubbles (not just housing bubbles, just bubbles), the subject of the bubble becomes to a certain extent commoditised. It is worth lots of money because it is an internet stock, and the ones in short supply that are really desirable like Amazon are not available, so let us buy this to reflect in Amazon's glory, not because of the fundamentals of the company itself.

This is how you can get both shortages and oversupply at the same time. You have shortages of desirable properties/good internet stocks/rare tulip bulbs popular with the rich and hard to propagate and oversupply of FHB properties/crap internet stocks/common tulip bulbs you can buy by the sackful. During a bubble, people use the real shortages in the desirable thing to argue there is a shortage in the crap. Bubbles fall once people realise that there is in fact no shortage of the crap (badly constructed shoebox apartments, badly constructed small FHB properties in the middle of nowhere and no restrictions on building more) and that it really *is* crap. In fact people around here already kindof know this with the warnings about new estates and the developer building more of the same and the limits this puts on capital gains.

One of the things I've read about Houston (who famously avoided a property bubble) is that they do have expensive houses. It's just their crap is priced like crap.

Another issue though is willingness to service your loan. I have a suspicion that if you see house prices around you fall, will you be willing to eat baked beans night after night to keep your house or will you be more likely to go "stuff it", especially if you are young, have no other assets and have no kids. Especially if you couldn't save enough to not need the FHB grant in the first place.
 
Good points well said.

I've always told people - in boom times, crap goes up along with good stuff. But in bad times, crap comes crashing back to reality - ie the toilet. Check out the country called Greece for an example of crap and it crashing back to reality
 
Deltaberry you make a good point about the RBA having more room to move on rates. However I'm not too sure that the RBA has that much room to move on interest rates. When the US Fed started cutting in August 2007 in response to their housing crash, the US interest rate was 5.26 per cent. That is actually *higher* than the RBA's current interest rate of 4.75 per cent. The US Fed had even more room to move than the RBA did and it didn't help them at all.

http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/?s[1][id]=FEDFUNDS

Countering this though is that Australians typically have variable home loans while fixed loans are the norm in the US. Which means that interest rate cuts may have more of an effect in Australian than the US.

Countering my counter though is that I'm not sure Australia can drop to 0.10% interest rates like America without the currency collapsing.
 
Deltaberry you make a good point about the RBA having more room to move on rates. However I'm not too sure that the RBA has that much room to move on interest rates. When the US Fed started cutting in August 2007 in response to their housing crash, the US interest rate was 5.26 per cent. That is actually *higher* than the RBA's current interest rate of 4.75 per cent. The US Fed had even more room to move than the RBA did and it didn't help them at all.

http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/?s[1][id]=FEDFUNDS

Countering this though is that Australians typically have variable home loans while fixed loans are the norm in the US. Which means that interest rate cuts may have more of an effect in Australian than the US.

Countering my counter though is that I'm not sure Australia can drop to 0.10% interest rates like America without the currency collapsing.

Australia is NOT THE US

Some glearing differences:
*non-recourse vs recourse loans
* % of properties built to 'flip'
*% of properties financed as prime vs subprime
*increase in supply of properties prior to GFC

We are not comparing apples with apples.
 
Also, we have already been thru GFC mark I and came thru vaguely intact compared to the rest of the world ... means we are in a much stronger position than the USA to weather GFC mark II.
 
Too bad you can't short mortgage tranches. If GFC II happens most who brought post 2009 are in trouble.

If you are sure about GFC2 - the best banks to short are Tier-2 banks like BOQ. Their loan book is absolutely shocking - they get the stuff that the Big 4 wouldn't touch with a 10-foot pole.
 
I have no doubt that when the Eurozone blows up the first thing the Governmetn will do is heavily restrict short selling just as they did in GFC I.
 
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